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ABSTRACT 
 
KOREA’S SUCCESSFUL EXPORT PROMOTION STRATEGY:  
A LESSON TO ERITREA? 
 
By 
 
Eyob Kahsai Michael 
 
The second half of the last century was difficult for many developing countries. Wide 
fluctuations in commodity price, the rapid accumulation of external debt, and changes in 
world trade and macroeconomic conditions have been among the many problems they 
have had to face. The Asian developing countries were able to adjust to these changing 
conditions and have been among the most rapidly growing countries in the world; and 
prospects for future growth remain bright. Developing countries in other regions, 
including African and Latin American countries, have been less successful; many are 
beset with problems, including huge debt burdens (where Brazil can be cited as an 
example), high inflation rates, and overall economic stagnation. Apart from these 
problems, African countries found themselves embroiled with civil war and famine.  
To overcome these problems and achieve sustainable economic development Latin 
American countries resorted to Import Substitution Strategy (ISI) while Asian countries, 
particularly Korea, Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Chinese Hong Kong vigorously and 
aggressively pursued an outward looking and market oriented Export strategies. African 
states mostly attempted to adopt economic policies prescribed by their former colonizers. 
The result was diametrically opposed. Latin American countries virtually stagnated while 
Asian countries; particularly the four countries mentioned above – the Asian Tigers, 
scored a remarkable economic growth. Almost all African countries experienced negative 
growth.  
The reasons why different regions scored different economic growth may be many but no 
one can deny that the economic policy pursued by each one is the main culprit. It is here 
where the picture of my country Eritrea comes. As a new nation that has recently joined 
the World community, it has ample opportunities to learn from the successes and failures 
of other countries.  
The aim of the paper is, thus, to see whether Eritrea can learn from the success of Korea. 
This research paper attempts to draw compelling lessons from the remarkable success of 
Korea’s export promotion strategy as an engine of growth. The paper starts by assessing 
Eritrea’s economic and trade policies and performances and goes into analyzing Korea’s 
export promotion strategies mainly of the 1960s – the era Korean miracle begun, and 
relating Korean economic, social and political situations to the Eritrean situation. After 
doing so, the paper identifies those lessons pertaining to Eritrea. The paper also critically 
reviews Eritrea’s trade policy instruments and institutions. An attempt is also made to 
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give a bird’s eye view of WTO protocols that need to be taken into consideration when 
and if Eritrea decides to join the Organization. 
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ERITREA, a newly born African Nation, is located in the Horn of Africa, bordered on 
the north-east and east by the Red Sea, on the south-east by Djibouti, on the south by 
Ethiopia and on the west and north-west by the Sudan. The total area of Eritrea is about 
124,000Km2 and includes the Dahlak Archipelago, a group of around 365 islands lying 
off the coast of the port of Massawa. Its Red Sea coastline extends for about 670 miles 
(1,000Km). Eritrea became an independent state in May 1991 and the Eritrean population 
confirmed its support for independence in an internationally supervised referendum held 
in April 1993.1 
The 30 years of war for liberation and years of recurrent drought left the economy 
virtually crippled and devastated. The cost of freedom in terms of loss of human life, 
displacement of population, economic and social disruption and environmental 
degradation was enormous.2 The Government of the State of Eritrea inherited a country 
with virtually no physical and institutional infrastructure. To add insult to injury, when 
the Eritrean economy was about to take-off our neighbor to the south – Ethiopia opened 
war under the guise of border dispute. This war also aggravated the already dilapidated 
economy. 
The Government of the state of Eritrea is now faced with immense challenges of 
reconstruction. It has to rehabilitate and transform the war ravaged socio-economic 
system while at the same time laying sound foundations for its further development. One 
of the prime objectives of the Government is to alleviate poverty of the people. To tackle 
this huge task different remedies and policy recommendations can be prescribed. One is 
                                                 
1 Eritrea Investment Brochure, 1993. 
2 Macroeconomic Policy of the Government of the State of Eritrea, Nov. 1994. 
Introduction 
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to reform the trade policy in such a way as to boast export volume and to increase income 
of the poor so as to eventually achieve sustaining growth and development. 
 
The Objective of the Paper 
 
Eritrea has been less than successful in integrating into the world economy and benefiting 
from trade reform programs. The reasons are many. Chief among them are lack of viable 
trade policy, weak trade and financial institutions, low level of foreign direct investment, 
lack of effective complementary policies and institutions. In order to create an enabling 
environment that would stimulate the supply side of the economy that generates 
employment and economic growth, there must be a viable trade policy, along with those 
key ingredients that are lacking in Eritrea – investment climate, investment in human 
capital, infrastructure, good governance in public and private sector, efficient financial 
sector, etc., 
The objective of the paper, thus, is after assessing Eritrea’s trade policy and export 
performance, and critically analyzing trade policy and strategy pursued by successful 
country – Korea, and WTO rules and regulations, to come up with trade policy proposal, 
which I believe would help as a basis for policy makers of the country. 
 
Structure of the paper 
 
The structure of the paper will be as follows: After briefly introducing Eritrea’s economic 
and trade policy in chapter I, Eritrea’s export trade performance will be discussed in 
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section II. In Chapter III, literature review regarding trade policy will be presented. The 
reason why Korea is chosen as a source of a lesson will be discussed in chapter IV. In 
Chapter V an attempt will be made to identify Korea’s Export Promotion Strategy of 
1950s and 1960s. Situational Analysis between Eritrea and Korea will be discussed and 
evaluated in section VI. In Chapter VII the most important lessons from Korea will be 
discussed and evaluated. The principal trade policy instruments and institutions are 
discussed and evaluated in Chapter VIII. The most important complementary policies are 
discussed in Chapter IX.  
Given the importance of agriculture and business services for a poverty reduction strategy 
that employs trade, these sectors are accorded special section - Chapter X. At last, 
Concluding remarks and Policy recommendations are forwarded in Chapter XI. In the 
appendix section Eritrea’s economic indicators, trade statistics and other relevant 
statistical date are presented. 
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After Eritrea won its independence in 1993 and the dust of war settled, it downed on the 
liberation army turned Government of Eritrea the severity of the damage inflicted on the 
economy by the defunct government of Ethiopia. Once a vibrant economy, the country 
was destroyed beyond comprehension. Therefore, to kick-start and to spur the wheel of 
the economy, the Government of Eritrea needed to create a policy to guide the long-term 
economic development of the country. As such, the Government is currently engaged in 
creating a modern, technologically competitive economy where the private enterprise is 
the driving economic force. To achieve this goal, the Government has adopted a broad 
based growth strategy that has aspects of rehabilitation, reconstruction and development 
covering all sectors of the economy (Macroeconomic Policy the Government of the State 
of Eritrea, Nov. 1994). The strategy’s main components are to: - 
¾ Improve agricultural production and productivity through the development of 
irrigated agriculture and assist peasants, pastoralists and agropastoralists to 
enhance their productivity by providing new farming and grazing methods; 
¾ Develop capital and knowledge intensive, export oriented industries and services; 
¾ Develop tourism sector; 
¾ Create an internationally competitive financial sector; 
Chapter I 
Eritrea’s Economic Policy 
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¾ Develop and systematize a public health care system; 
¾ Provide a broad based education system and improve access to it; 
¾ Provide effective social welfare and safety net system; and 
¾ Safe guard and upgrade the environment from undue pollution. 
 
The centerpiece of this strategy is the establishment of an efficient, outward looking, 
private sector-led market economy with the Government playing a pro-active role to 
stimulate private economic activities. While the public sector would normally be 
restricted to those areas that the private may tend to avoid, public investment programs in 
strategic sub-sectors can be initiated to stimulate economic growth and supplement the 
efforts of the private sector. In such cases, all strategic public investments will be 
operated on commercial bases, and eventual divestiture would not be excluded.3  
In keeping with these development objectives and strategies, the Government designed a 
macro-policy framework to stimulate private investment and engender economic revival 
and growth. The thrust of the policy is the swift transition to a market economy, a liberal 
trade policy, a central role for the private sector and export – led growth. 
As part of the macro-policy the investment proclamation is designed to mobilize 
investment capital from internal and external sources for export industries, by having 
external trade taxes and exchange rate regimes that favor exports. It also aims at creating 
and expanding employment opportunity, encourage the introduction of new technologies 
to enhance productivity, and foster the growth of small and medium scale enterprises. 
The proclamation provides incentives such as a nominal 2% tax on capital goods, 
                                                 
3 Macroeconomic Policy of the Government of the State of Eritrea, Nov. 1994. 
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industrial spare parts and raw materials, and exemption from export duties and sales taxes 
for exports.4 
Income taxes have been re-evaluated to range from 2 – 30% on corporate profit, 2-20% 
on commercial agricultural profit, 2 - 30% on rent income. On top of these, any corporate 
profit that is set aside for re-investment shall be taxed at the rate of 20%. There shall be 
no taxes on declared dividends. The proclamation also allows loss incurred during the 
first two years of operation by an investor to be carried forward for three consecutive 
years. Foreign exchange may be remitted out of Eritrea for, among others, net profits and 
dividends accrued from investment capital, debt-service payments for foreign loans 
incurred pursuant to the proclamation, and payments received from the sale or transfer of 
shares. Investors may retain up to 100% of their export earnings in foreign currency in 
Eritrea in accordance with Bank regulation.5 
Closely tied to the success of any investment is the allocation of land. The land 
proclamation eradicates the antiquated practices of land allocation and creates a new 
system where ownership of all land is vested in the Government. This proclamation will 
spur growth by making land for business and residential purposes easily accessible to all 
who would put it to use. 
Trade Policy 
The Government of the state of Eritrea has also made it clear in its trade policy that it 
would:6 
¾ Foster liberal internal and external trade regimes with limited intervention that 
would not contradict the tenets of free trade. This will mean, among other things, 
                                                 
4 Gazette of Eritrean Laws, Vol. 10/2001 No. 4, Septmber 24, 2001. 
5 Ibid., 
6 Macroeconomic Policy of the Government of the State of Eritrea, Nov. 1994. 
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liberalizing and simplifying the licensing regime and reducing and eliminating 
tariff and non-tariff barriers; 
¾ Foster export and export based industries and services by providing preferential 
financing, assistance in international market penetration and strong promotional 
support to aid exports, and support mechanisms for quality and standards control; 
¾ Encourage participation in regional bilateral and multilateral trade and economic 
cooperation; 
¾ Assist and encourage the private sector to play a leading role in both domestic and 
external markets; 
¾ The role of the public sector will be limited to regulatory functions and the import 
and export of critical commodities and supplies required in several sectors. 
¾ Help build the institutional capacity that would make Eritrea a trading country; 
¾ Encourage and support participation of Eritreans living abroad in trading activities. 
Despite these policy aim, the country lacks policy such as anti-dumping, countervailing 
measures, subsidy, and safeguard measures. The country is not a member of WTO, too.  
The country’s current tariff and other trade related issues are discussed at great length in 
chapter VIII. 
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Eritrea’s major exports consist of primary products such as live animals, fish, sesame 
seed, natural gum (gum Arabic) salt and manufactured products such as leather and 
leather products, textiles and garments, and intra-ocular lenses. Imports consist mainly 
machinery, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, electronic appliances, wheat, sugar etc.,7 
Historically, Eritrea has been a trading nation, given its strategic location and easy access 
to the markets of the Middle East and Africa. In the 1940s its export base was relatively 
diversified earning – by 1970s – approximately USD 100 million worth of foreign 
exchange per year. During that period a variety of its industrial products used to be 
exported to Djibouti, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Sudan, Yemen and other neighboring 
countries.8 
At present there are over 40,000 licensed traders in the country. Added to those who 
carry trading activities in the informal sector, it can be fairly concluded that next to 
agriculture trade is the economic activity that accounts the highest for the livelihood of 
the Eritrean population. 
As mentioned above Eritrea’s economy, at the time of liberation, was virtually destroyed. 
To revive such a devastated economy needs a huge investment and a tremendous effort. 
                                                 
7 Trade report, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Government of the State of Eritrea, 1998. 
8Ogbazghi, Bereket-AB, A collection of Country Report, Courses on Trade Promotion Strategies for 
African Countries, KDI & KOICA, 2000. 
Chapter II 
Eritrea’s Trade Performance
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During the first five years of independence, where Eritrea breathed peace for the first 
time in its history, the country in general and the economy in particular managed to score 
a very commendable achievements – unprecedented in post-colonial Africa. The 
economy was growing at 8% per annum.  
During those glorious years Eritrea’s main trading partner was Ethiopia. Over 60% of its 
product was destined to Ethiopia. However, once again war broke between these two 
neighboring countries and Eritrea’s trade and economic growth started to trickle. As the 
trade statistics below indicate Eritrea’s export was increasing steadily. Import also was 
growing in a much higher rate. This is because in those first five years machineries, 
equipments and other vital inputs for growth had to be imported. 
 
                                                                                                  In millions of Dollars 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Imports (CIF) 275 396 401 514 
Exports (FOB) 36 65 81 95 
Source: US State Department. 
 
The table above shows import surpasses export by manifold, indicating that there is a 
huge trade imbalance. Trade statistics from 1995 - 2001 depicted in tables 1, 2, and 3 
(appendices) also confirm this trend.  
Currently, Eritrea’s main sources of hard currency are “remittances from Eritreans in 
Diaspora and loans from the World Bank, African Development Bank, Arab 
Development Bank, European Union and aid from donor agencies and governments”. It 
is quite apparent that the Government of Eritrea cannot and should not rely heavily on 
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these sources. It is high time to device ways and means to boast its export. And to do so, 
one of the prime objectives of the Government should be “to assess its trade policy and 
instrumental mechanisms” and find remedial solutions to all the stumbling blocks to the 
growth of export trade. This is what the paper aims to accomplish – to assess the 
country’s trade practices and suggest remedial solutions. 
Now that the war with Ethiopia is over the Government of Eritrea has shifted its focus 
towards reconstruction and rehabilitation. As recently as eight months ago, i.e., last May 
2002 the Government proclaimed “Eritrea’s Marshal Plan – titled Warsay – Yekaalo” in 
memory for those gallant Eritreans who gave their lives for the liberation and defense of 
the country. This plan is Eritrea’s own version of the Marshal Plan. Issayas Tesfamariam, 
an Eritrea described it as “...It is a comprehensive, revolutionary, and an all-out, all-round 
economic rehabilitation and recovery program that is designed not to be only a “mere 
palliative” but rather to be a “crucial lubricant in the engine of comprehensive economic 
recovery”.9 One of the prime objectives of the plan is to alleviate poverty. And one way 
to alleviate poverty is through a comprehensive trade reform. Definitely Eritrea’s trade 
policy and mechanism has to undergo reform so as to ensure a speedy recovery of the 
economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Wefri Warsay-Yekaalo – Eritrea’s own marshall Plan, June 16, 2002, www.biddho.com 
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As indicated in chapter II above trade policy of Eritrea aims at boasting free trade.  Aim 
alone would not bring the desired result. It has to be augmented with effective trade 
mechanisms and policies. Evidence is that the economy remained stagnant. The reason is 
multi-faceted. One reason could be failure to revive and develop the domestic industries. 
The other and main factor is failure to institute the right strategies and effective 
institutional settings. The evolution of Eritrea’s domestic industries dates back to the 
1930s when the country was under the Italian colony. Eritrea was the most industrialized 
country in the Horn of Africa. However, thirty years of armed struggle and deliberate 
policy of neglect and mismanagement by the last two oppressive regimes of Ethiopia 
brought the industrial activity of the country almost to a standstill. Agriculture, too, is 
very traditional and underdeveloped. The same is true with the other economic sectors. 
The question one may ask would then be what trade strategy should Eritrea follow so as 
to revive its economy and be able to achieve sustainable development: Import 
substitution or export promotion?  
 
 
 
 
Chapter III 
Trade and Development: 
Export Promotion VS. Import Substitution
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Import – Substitution Industrialization Strategy 
 
One of the problems that developing countries face in trying to improve their 
development growth rate is failure to identify ways to integrate their economies with the 
world economy. The basic question is whether they should encourage international trade 
with other countries or focus more on producing goods that substitute for international 
trade. There are two approaches. One approach is called the Import substitution.  
The strategy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) entails replacement of 
commodities previously imported (usually manufactured goods) with domestic 
production. It includes a number of industrialization policies based on a very little degree 
of international openness.  
It was initiated in many Latin American Countries (LACs) as a reaction to the disruptions 
caused by WWI and WWII, the economic depression of the 1930s.10 After 1955, ISI was 
pursued as a deliberately industrialization strategy. It was stimulated mainly by the 
thoughts of Prebisch and Singer in the 1950s.11 
Developing countries have virtually no power in international competition and therefore 
cannot develop domestic market for export. So they may choose an import substitution 
policy naturally. Countries can develop their market when they choose import 
substitution policy primarily, because this policy makes a barrier of import from their 
countries so that domestic market can improve. According to this protection, domestic 
                                                 
10 Sato, Akihiro, IS and EP policy for trading, College of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of 
Tsukuba, June 25, 2002. 
11 Krueger, Anne O., The Effects of Trade Strategies on Growth, Finance and Development, June 1983. 
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market can develop with balanced and stabilized12. Akihiro Sato argues, “…Historically, 
many Asian countries have developed with an import substitution policy at first step of 
developing process. Similarly, developing countries can improve their market with an 
import substitution policy. The advantages in this policy make their market grow because 
of some restrictions for trading particularly import from other…” 13  However, the 
experience of Latin American Countries particularly that of Brazil indicate that at first the 
policy seems to work well but later on it tends to be less and less successful the longer it 
continues.  
The table14 below shows the difference in economic growth in countries that have tried 
the import substitution strategy compared to those that have tried the export-led growth 
strategy. The table compares four countries: Brazil, Colombia, South Korea and Tunisia 
over a 23-year period. Brazil switched from an import-substitution strategy to an export-
led growth strategy and saw increased economic growth. By the 1970s, economic growth 
in Brazil was in double digits, much higher than in the 1950s and early 1960s. The 
change was also dramatic in Colombia.15 The most dramatic change has been in South 
Korea. The Korean success story, which begun in the 1960s, seems related to the switch 
from an import-substitution strategy to one relying on trade and export growth.16 The 
same basic phenomenon is apparent in Tunisia as well as many other countries.  
 
                                                 
12 Liang, Hong, A thesis on the rationals of import substitution industrialization strategy, ISBN: 1-58112-
007-9, University of Denver, USA. 
13 Sato, Akihiro, IS and EP policy for trading, College of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of 
Tsukuba, June 25, 2002. 
14 Urrutia, Miguel and Seiji Naya, “Lessons in Development: A comparative study of Asia and Latin 
America”, International Center for Economic Growth, 1989. 
15 Ibid; 
16 Hyun Nam, Chong, Paper presented to the eleventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sept. 
1980, KDI, Seoul, Korea. 
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Country  Period   Trade Strategy  Growth Rate 
Brazil   1955-0   Import substitution   6.9 
Brazil   1960-5                         Import substitution   4.2 
Brazil   1965-0                   Export-led    7.6 
Brazil   1970-6                  Export-led    10.6 
 
Colombia  1955-0                         Import substitution   4.6 
Colombia  1960-5                         Import substitution   1.9 
Colombia  1970-6                 Export-led    6.5 
 
South Korea  1953-0                        Import substitution   5.2 
South Korea   1960-5                        Export-led    6.5 
South Korea   1970-6                  Export-led    10.3 
 
Tunisia  1960-0                        Import substitution   4.6 
Tunisia  1970-6                 Export-led    9.4  
 
I strongly believe that this experience indicates that a better strategy for increasing 
economic growth is to be outward looking rather than inward looking. A country’s 
chance of catching up is greatly increased if it can adopt technology and use investment 
from abroad. By engaging in international trade, countries are able to learn more about 
technologies in other countries. For example, as South Korea’s exports of electronic 
equipment grew, the Koreans learned more about technology for producing electric goods. 
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More countries appear to be changing their policies from inward looking to outward 
looking, based on this experience. Mexico, for example, lowered its restrictions on 
imports in the mid-1980s and joined the United States and Canada in a free trade area in 
the 1990s.17 However, Akihiro Sato argues as “…For free trading, there is no protection 
barrier so foreign companies can enter into domestic market. And at last developing 
countries’ markets can improve by efficient management of the foreign companies and 
low domestic labor cost. But this system has also disadvantages. When we talk about free 
trade, domestic market must be opened. So if domestic market has not improved enough, 
foreign companies may control their market. Export promotion policy has foreign 
companies in developing countries, instead of free trade’s benefits”.18 
As a result, I can say import substitution policy is a prerequisite for export promotion 
development policy. This allows some degree of industrialization to take place, some 
development of an industrial labor force, and some expansion of modern infrastructure. 
All of these are necessary for export led development.    
 
Export Promotion Strategy 
 
As the facts presented in the table above indicate an alternative way to increase growth is 
the export-led strategy. Under this strategy, expanding exports encourages international 
trade. Hence, the strategy tends to be outward looking. Growth occurs through the 
manufacture and sale of products to other countries. The aim of export-led growth is to 
                                                 
17 Javier Prieto, Francisco and Sherry M. Stephenson, “Regional Liberalization of Trade in Services”, 
Development, Trade, and the WTO, A Hand Book, World Bank, 2002. 
18 Sato, Akihiro, IS and EP policy for trading, College of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of 
Tsukuba, June 25, 2002. 
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increase trade rather than reduce trade. Although many countries that have followed 
export led strategies have also had high tariffs on some commodities, such as agricultural 
goods, their strategies have been much more outward looking than those of the import 
substitution.19  
The 1987 World Development Report (WDR87) of the World Bank uses the evidence 
provided by Greeaway and Nam (Kyklos, 1988) to suggest that the performance of 
outward looking economies has been superior to that of inward looking economies.  
What, then, is the advantages of export led strategy? 
Urrutia, Miguel and Seiji Naya enumerate them as follows:20 
 
¾ Export promotion is a better policy because it involves incentives rather than 
controls, and because measures can be applied more generally across the board. 
Whereas import substitution policies discriminate against exports and create 
market distortion, many export promotion policies give similar incentives to 
production for domestic and export markets. Whereas import controls are usually 
highly selective, export incentives usually do not differentiate much between 
individual export commodities.  
¾ It is easier to detect the effectiveness of export promotion policies because export 
performance can be observed easily and the policy mistakes of export promotion 
corrected more quickly.  
¾ Export promotion gives industries the opportunity to enlarge their markets and 
achieve greater economies of scale.  
                                                 
19 Krueger, Anne O., The Effects of Trade Strategies on Growth, Finance and Development, June 1983. 
20 Urrutia, Miguel and Seiji Naya, “Lessons in Development: A comparative study of Asia and Latin 
America”, International Center for Economic Growth, 1989 
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¾ Export oriented development forces industries to compete in the international 
market and achieve greater efficiency.  
 
Keesing21 also argued that under an export promotion regime, international competition 
forces domestic entrepreneurs to pay close attention to the possibilities to innovations and 
speeding up the learning processes.  
Then, which strategy should Eritrea use to achieve rapid economic growth? Import 
substitution or export promotion? 
My view is the following: 
The history of Latin American Countries show that import substitution could not bring 
the desired result, though the effectiveness of any policy depends on the prevailing 
domestic and external conditions. Development of an export-oriented economy will be 
crucial to Eritrea’s rehabilitation and its long-term sustainability, too. There are several 
reasons why this strategy will be the most beneficial. Eritrea’s past performance indicates 
that it can handle a much larger export base. Eritrea is but a small country with a very 
narrow domestic market. Once the needs of its small market have been met, export 
expansion will be the main engine of growth. Its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula 
gives it greater advantage to competitively export to the Arab countries. If Eritrea decides 
to follow export led strategy, then there are major lessons t be drawn from the Korean 
experience with trade policy. On the other hand, I believe there must be some sort of 
protection to the infant domestic industries until such time they become competitive in 
                                                 
21 Keesing, Donald B., “Outward Looking Policies and Economic Development,” Economic Journal, June 
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the world market and are financially strong. However, there must be time limit to the 
protection.  
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As indicated in the introductory remark, as a new member of the world community, 
Eritrea has the advantage to learn from the successes and failures of all the countries of 
the world. As failure is the mother of success, Africa’s failed states teach Eritrea to avoid 
the path these countries pursued. On the other hand, Eritrea can amply learn from the 
successes of “The Asian Tigers”, namely, Korea, Chinese Taipei, Chinese Hong Kong 
and Singapore. From these four countries it is Korea’s economic and political situations 
in the 1950s and 1960s that strikingly resemble today’s Eritrea. For this reason alone, it is 
tempting to take a lesson from Korea’s export promotion strategy. Then, what are the 
similarities between Eritrea and Korea?  
 
Political Similarities: 
 
Both Eritrea and Korea share more or less the same turbulent histories. Both were victims 
of colonial aggression. Both countries fought bitter wars for their independences. Both 
countries had to fight for their survival after achieving independence. Korea had to go 
through the civil war of 1950 – 1953 and Eritrea had to fight for its existence and 
sovereignty against Ethiopia during 1998 – 2000 border war. Again, though they are 
geographically very far apart, both of them are located in areas that are militarily and 
Why Korea? 
Chapter IV 
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economically very strategic, which makes them very prone to foreign influence and 
aggression. At the time of their independences from colonial rules, both countries did not 
have well functioning government settings. 
 The main difference between the two countries, however, is that the worldwide condition 
was favorable when Korea achieved its independence. The early years of the 60s were the 
time when the Cold War was at its height and was characterized by the Cuban missile 
crisis. Hence to deter the spread of communism in East Asian countries, the US 
government was heavily involved in the political and economic affairs of Korea. To 
stabilize its economy and allure its people, the US generously extended its aid packages, 
which undeniably played a decisive role in capital accumulation. The year Eritrea won its 
independence, however, international political situation was quite different. The former 
USSR - “evil empire” crumbled, German unification took place, the Gulf War was a fresh 
memory, etc., Therefore, the US and Western Europe were busy containing the aftermath 
of the Gulf War and totally absorbed by the unfolding situation of the fall of communism. 
On top of these, Eritrea’s independence was not warmly welcomed by the US and EU, as 
they know little about the guerilla army turned government and wrongly suspected 
Eritrea’s independence will lead to the destabilization of the entire Horn of Africa, 
particularly Ethiopia. Due to these reasons, Eritrea was refused the desperately needed 
aid to heal the wounds of war and to kick – start the process of building a viable state.   
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Economic and Social Similarities: 
 
During the colonial era of 1910 to 1945, Seong Min Hong argues that the Korean 
economy experienced rapid structural transformation. He further argues that the structural 
pattern of this development was largely determined by the Japanese colonial regime. As a 
result, the Korean economy experienced what is known as colonial enclave 
industrialization.22 Eritrea’s history is practically the same. Eritrea also experienced a 
very rapid industrialization during the Italian colonial era, 1886 – 1942. For its war 
efforts during WWII, Fascist Italy erected industries so as to ensure a smooth supply for 
its war machine.  
After they won their independences, both countries inherited a devastated economy. Both 
experienced chronic shortage of food and unemployment. Both countries are not blessed 
with natural endowments. However, both countries are blessed with a very dedicated and 
resilient people - People that are fiercely patriotic and with “we can do” attitude. Both 
peoples have the same social fabric – both enjoy extended family ties, friendship and 
communal life.  
Their significant difference is “population size”. Even though both have more or less the 
same land size, Eritrea’s population size is quite small as compared to Korea’s. Korea’s 
population size, in 1945, is estimated to be 16 million23 while that of Eritrea is only 4 
million. Korea is, also, made up of one ethnic group – one language, one history and one 
                                                 
22 Seong Min Hong, KIME Mideast Studies, 2001 
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culture24 while Eritrea is multiethnic country – nine different languages, nine different 
ethnic groups and cultures. 
The other main difference is that Korea had a relatively literate labor force while Eritrea 
was and is devoid of this wealth. 
 
Problem Statement: 
 
The economic, political and social resemblance between these two countries, though are 
half of the globe apart from each other, is persuasive enough to make the hypothesis that 
“Korea’s export promotion strategy led to higher per capita income; lessons for Eritrea”.  
The export promotion strategy that Korea pursued in achieving higher per capita income 
is a good lesson for the Eritrean case. 
                                                 
24 Ibid; 
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 In his paper, Seong Min Hong explains that Korea was totally in disarray after it won its 
independence from Japan in 1945. There was considerable disruption after 1945 because 
of plant exhaustion; loss of linkages with Japanese capital and loss of technical expertise, 
distribution systems and markets; and the subsequent obliteration of the industrial plant 
during the Korean War (1950 –1953)25. He further says that the Korean War destroyed 
almost two-third of the nation’s productive capacity, and almost 1 million civilians were 
killed. Jungho Yoo explains the decade that follows as: “…The rest of the decade was 
spent recouping from its destruction. The thrust of economic policy was import-
substituting industrialization behind high protective barriers. The aid that the US 
extended to Korea was the main source of foreign exchange. However, when the US 
made it known that it would no longer extend its financial aid, the masses’ subsistence 
was put at risk, since US aid financed most imported goods such as grain and other food 
stuffs.”26 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Seong Min Hong, KIME Mideast Studies, 2001 
26 Jungho yoo, Neoclassical versus Revisionist View of Korean Economic Growth, Discussion paper No. 
588, Harvard University, June 1997. 
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Export Promotion Strategies in the 1960s 
 
The decision the US made to stop aid forced the Korean government to look for 
alternative sources of foreign exchange. One possibility was to increase export, thus the 
slogan “nation-building through exportation”27. To promote export the government had to 
take a series of policy measures. One of many incentives introduced was unification of 
the exchange rate, and the currency, the won, was twice devalued to correct overvaluation 
– which was the cause of a large excess of import demand over export.28  
Tax exemptions were also widely used. For example, Bon-Ho Koo explains that imported 
inputs destined for export production were exempted from tariffs.29 A key incentive, 
however, was the introduction of preferential credit scheme for exporters. This scheme 
allowed exporters to enjoy automatic access to bank loans, usually at well below market 
interest rates. On top of these, other incentives such as wastage allowances for tax 
purposes, export-import link schemes and reduced public utility rates were offered at one 
time or another, and a cash subsidy for exports operated briefly in the early ‘60s.30 To 
provide exporters with information on foreign markets, the Korea Trade Promotion 
Corporation (KOTRA) was established in 1964.31 In addition, the 1960s saw the first 
steps toward import liberalization. Korea joined the GATT in 1967. This openness to 
international market allowed the world’s technological frontier to be absorbed by 
Korea.32 
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The success of Korean Industrialization 
 
Korea’s successful industrial growth began in the early 1960s, when the government 
instituted sweeping economic reforms emphasizing exports and labor-intensive light 
industries. The government led economic development in its early stages since the private 
sector was weak. Government intervention in economic areas such as resources allocation 
complemented the creativity and market principles of the private sector. As indicated in 
the preceded paragraph, during this period, the government strengthened administrative 
support for industries. Apart from replacing trade laws with new international trade law 
and the establishment of KOTRA, the government also held monthly trade promotion 
conferences to evaluate export promotion measures and to work out the difficulties 
related to exports.33  
 
Introduction of Foreign Capital 
 
For economic development, it was and is necessary to accumulate capital formation. Thus, 
for Korea, the mobilization of funds for capital formation was the most pressing 
economic problem.  
Even though the government attempted to mobilize domestic funds for capital formation 
in the 1960s through various policy measures, it was impossible to provide sufficient 
funds for the voracious investment demand.34 There was only one-way to fill this gap: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
33 Bon-Ho Koo, Korea’s Experience of Economic Development, KDI, 2002 
34 Jungshik Son, Money and banking for economic development – Korea’s early development decades. 
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foreign capital introduction. To this end, several laws promoting foreign capital 
inducement were rewritten into a single bill, the Foreign Capital Inducement Act.35 This 
aimed to stimulate foreign loans, investment and technology transfers by providing tax 
shelters and extending tax exemptions, warranting free remittance and repayment 
guarantees by the government or government-owned commercial banks. Unlike foreign 
aid, these foreign loans had to be paid someday, therefore efficient and productive uses 
were imperative and the government set up various screening processes to weed out 
unimportant or unproductive projects.36  
In the 1960s, the government welcomed foreign capital inflows without paying too much 
attention to the debt-servicing burden, terms of financing, linkage effects or the unfair 
competitive edge of large industries borrowing abroad at lower interest rates over the 
small and medium industry borrowing in the domestic market which had to borrow at 
higher rates. 
 
The Role of the Government 
 
In 1961 General Park Chung Hee overthrew the popularly elected regime of Prime 
Minister Chang Myon. Seong Min Hong argues that Park’s prime objective, after his 
accession to power, was to transform the country from an agrarian economy into a 
modern industrial powerhouse.37  
He decided, then, that his administration has to play a key role in the economic 
development of the country because no other Korean institution had the capacity or 
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resources to direct such drastic change in a short time.  The resulting economic system 
incorporated elements of both state capitalism and free enterprise. However, the 
revisionists counter argues that there was extensive market intervention by the state.38  
Which I believe is the case because the Korean government provided the vision of future 
economic development around which the private firms’ investments are organized. 
Therefore, investments were done not according to the laws of the market but were 
directly coordinated by the state. One of the key initiatives of the Park government was to 
create a powerful central economic policy coordination body, the Economic Planning 
Board. This agency took charge of designing and executing Five-Year Economic 
Development Plans, which contained both macroeconomic planning and industry-level 
indicative planning.39 The economy was dominated by a group of Chaebol, large private 
conglomerates.  
The government guided private industry through a series of export and production targets 
utilizing the control of credit, informal means of pressure and persuasion. In 1961 Park 
extended government control over business by nationalizing the banks and merging the 
agricultural cooperative movement with the agricultural bank.40 The government's direct 
control over all institutional credit further extended Park's command over the business 
community. The government provided incentives through the allowance of subsidy loan 
to invest in the priority industries. The government also took a central role in “projecting 
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a vision and mobilizing and allocating financial resources, but left actual business 
activities mostly to the private sector”.41  
To sum up, the most important factor of Korean economic growth was the government’s 
will to transfer the labor force from latent unemployment to employment in the process of 
economic development.42 In 1960s, Korea had a high quality and plentiful low price labor 
force. Foreign capital played a great role to set on labor force, potential for development. 
Owing to the lack of capital accumulation in agricultural sector, influx of foreign capital 
was an indispensable factor to develop the country at the outset. In short, Korean 
economic growth can be characterized as a government-led, foreign capital-depended, 
industrialization-promotion and export-oriented. 
 
Social Costs of the Korean Development Strategy 
 
The development strategy pursued by Korea brought a huge material benefits to the 
Korean people. From 1950s up to 1980s Korea scored a remarkable transformation from 
a back-warded economy to an industrial powerhouse. Its GDP growth rate averaged 8.8% 
during 1963-1990. GDP per capita reached $6,250 in 1991 as compared to that of the 
early 1960s, which was only $87.43 The change in the structure has also been impressive: 
the contribution of the agricultural sector in terms of employment and GDP declined 
from 63% and 43.4% in 1963 to 16% and 9% in 1990. While those of the manufacturing 
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sector rose from 8% and 15% in 1963 to 27% and 29% in 1990.44 The tables below show 
how remarkably share of exports in GDP and industrial origin of GDP increased from 
1961 up to 1990. 
Share of Exports in GDP 
Year Share of Exports in GDP Share of Manufacturing Goods in Total Exports 
1961 3.2% 15.2% 
1970 14.7% 77.4% 
1980 32.0% 90.2% 
1990 36.7% 93.8% 
Source: Bon-Ho Koo, Korea’s Experience of Economic Development, KDI, 2002 
 
Industrial Origin of GDP 
 
 
Year 
 
Mining and 
Agriculture 
 
Manufacturing Electricity 
and Construction 
 
 
Services 
1961 48.8% 12.3% 38.9% 
1970 32.4% 27.1% 40.5% 
1980 16.2% 40.1% 44.1% 
1993 7.4% 43.0% 50.8% 
Source: Bon-Ho Koo, Korea’s Experience of Economic Development, KDI, 2002 
 
However, this remarkable economic growth is not with out cost. Jong-Il You and Ha-
Won Jang argue that these costs are:45 
 
1. Political Freedom and Human Rights. General Park’s government main concern 
was economic development at any cost. Therefore, he neglected the basic human 
rights and political freedom of the people. He employed an authoritarian style of 
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45 Ha-Won Jang, Jong-Il You, Changing Role of the State in South Korea: From Leading to Supporting the 
Market, 2001. 
 
  38
administration, which resulted in gross human rights violation and political 
persecution. 
2. The other victim of this growth – maximization policy was the art of living 
together: Equity and community. The rapid industrialization led to a substantial 
disparity in income distribution. The enormous concentration of power and 
financial resources in the hands of Chaebol and their monopolized access to 
preferential loans and low-interest rate bank financing crowded out small and 
medium-sized business into the unorganized money markets. The other area 
where inequality loomed large is “regional inequalities”.  
3. The environment was practically neglected during the massive industrialization 
process. The damage inflicted on to the environment is very high.  
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Policies alone would not guarantee success. Policies can only make miracle if and only if 
the necessary conducive conditions are laid down. African states have beautiful policies 
but because they lack the necessary and vital conditions that would enable them to 
effectively implement their policies, they miserably failed to achieve what they set off to 
accomplish. Park’s government managed to boast Korea’s export and thereby the 
country’s economy simply because it could create and lay dawn the necessary conditions 
that would give rise to export promotion, albeit its undemocratic, ruthless and biased 
political system.  
Here I will attempt to show that Eritrea fulfills those conditions and hence Korea’s export 
promotion strategies are good lessons to Eritrea to promote and expand its export base. 
This does not, however, to mean that Eritrea has to resort to the type of government 
Korea had in the 1960s. I believe a democratic government committed to the cause of the 
people would be much more stronger in implementing its policies and rally the people 
behind its economic policies. 
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A. Political Situation 
 
However the Park government, the driving force behind Korea’s economic success, was 
an authoritarian, it was a strong, committed and consistent government. Jong-Il You 
describes the Park government as follows:  
“…It was beyond dispute that the Korean state has had an unusual ability to impose its 
policies with little resistance from either the capitalist class or the working class. Not 
only was its hands free to pursue relentless growth-maximization policies, but it was able 
to discipline errant capitalists or trouble-making workers who deviated from the course of 
action set out by the economic development plans”.46  
Jong-Il You further argues that one of the reasons why the Park government committed 
itself to development was, through economic development, it wanted to erase the 
illegitimacy of the coup.47 The strength of Park government emanates from weak social 
classes, the capitalists were dependent on the state, and landlords were stripped of their 
political and economic power through the land reform in the early 1950s. On top of these, 
Park’s government ruthlessly crushed labor and popular movements.48 
Eritrea has a guerrilla turned government that came to power after defeating Ethiopia’s 
colonial army and got its legitimacy through the popularly elected general assembly. The 
government is very popular and strong that it faces little resistance to implement its 
policies. The source of its strength is its ability to effectively communicate with the 
people, by encouraging the people to participate in all the government’s programs and by 
wholly embracing the peasantry. The selfless and simple way of life of the leadership has 
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also deepened the love of the people for the government. However, unlike Park’s 
government, Eritrea’s government does not directly interfere in areas of investment nor 
does it try to control the rate of exchange. This does not necessarily mean that Eritrea has 
to continue the way it is now without instituting democracy. Once it put all the vital 
democratic and government institutions in place and instituted all the necessary laws, 
then it has to call for election. This way it can ensure the continuation of a strong 
government. 
  
B. Land Reform 
 
Type of ownership of land is one of the stumbling blocks to economic growth in all 
developing countries. Though Korea is not free from all the problems associated with 
land, it has at least managed to take a sweeping land reform policy, in the early 1950s. 
This land reform allowed the Park’s government to have a free reign in its aggressive 
industrialization program.  
One of the big policy measures that the government of Eritrea managed to implement is 
the land reform that was enacted in 1997. This land reform law transferred the ownership 
of the land to the government. However, it guarantees every Eritrean peasants will have 
enough land to farm. It, also, secures the right of women to own a land. Therefore, the 
government can now allocate land, on lease, for investors.  
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C. Human Resource 
 
The people of Korea are obsessed by education. Every single family spends a fortune to 
educate their children. This helped Korea to acquire a highly qualified labor force. 
Korean success is nothing but the result of the sweat and dedication of its highly educated 
and disciplined work force. 
Eritrea does not possess this blessing. However, it has been quite a while since the 
current Eritrean government realized that without educated work force nothing could be 
achieved. To this end, the government took a series of measures to enhance education. 
One is offering free education for all. The other is constructing schools in every town and 
village. To overcome shortage of teachers, it has hired teachers from India. The third and 
crucial measure it took was, with the 60 million USD it borrowed from the World Bank, 
it is sending all first degree holders to South Africa, Europe and the US for further studies.  
 
D. Source of Foreign Fund. 
 
As it is indicated in the preceding chapter, Korea’s main source of foreign exchange was 
the US. The US not only extended its aid generously to Korea, but also opened its 
markets to Korean products and allowed it to borrow unlimited money from foreign 
banks.  
Eritrea’s relation with the US is strained due to various reasons. One is Eritrea feels 
betrayed and rightly so when the US took the lead in the mediation between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia during the 1998 - 200 border war. Also, the US usually attaches strings of 
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conditions to its aid package, which forces countries to compromise their national 
interests. Eritrea’s stand is to remain fiercely independent. However, there are some other 
European and Arab countries that have good relations with Eritrea. Besides, the World 
Bank, Arab Development Bank, African Development Bank and EU have good relations 
with the country. So, Eritrea does have a possibility to acquire seed funds to help her 
accumulate capital. 
 
E. Adequate Communication and Transport Infrastructure 
 
One of the most impressive achievements of the General Park’s government is it 
connected the whole of Korea through well built roads. The whole Korea is intertwined 
by road. Telephone and other means of communications are part of the daily life of the 
people. Korea’s stride in shipbuilding and car manufacturing further enhanced the sector. 
These help easy movements of people, resources and ideas.  
Eritrea lags far behind most countries as far as communication and transport 
infrastructure is concerned. However, one of the priorities of the government of Eritrea is 
to make accessible, through roads, all of the country. To this end, the government has 
constructed, in the last six years, over five thousand km long roads and is constructing 
now over three thousand asphalted road, due to be finished mid next year. It is expanding 
and rehabilitating its two major ports, with the fund it secured from the World Bank. It 
has erected electricity-generating station worth 186 million USD, a fund secured from the 
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Arab Development Bank. It now entered into the program of electrification of the whole 
country.49  
However, telecommunication, Internet services and other media outlets need massive 
investment. Before the 1997 financial crisis of Korea, joint venture agreement was 
reached between Eritrea and a Korea telecommunication company. The financial crisis of 
Korea killed the deal.  
 
F. Location Advantage 
 
Korea’s geographical location is very strategic. To the north is China and to the east is 
Japan. Therefore, It can easily reach the big markets around it. Eritrea is, also, located in 
a very strategic area. It can reach markets of the Arabian Peninsula and Africa with ease. 
  
G. Natural Endowment 
 
Korea is not endowed with natural resources. It entirely depends on foreign supply for 
raw material and other inputs. Its food requirement is dependent on foreign supply, too. 
Eritrea, on the other hand, though not yet fully assessed, is endowed with some precious 
metals, natural gas, abundant fish supply, and vast arable land. American, Canadian and 
Australian mining companies are exploring the potentiality of the resources. Also, the 
government is pushing, with every possible means, farmers and investors to enter into 
commercial agriculture so as to make Eritrea food self-sufficient. One may wonder why I 
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assert Eritrea has to strive to be food self-sufficient. The reason is that the people of 
Eritrea have been food aid dependent for the last thirty years due to war and recurrent 
draught.  The people have to regain its confidence that it can feed itself! It is more of 
psychological than economic. Besides, agriculture could be a good source of foreign 
currency. 
 
H. National Security 
 
Jong-Il You argues that one of the reasons why the Park regime committed itself to 
development was,  
“…The military leadership perceived that economic development was an imperative for 
national survival and dignity. For them, economic development was a national issue as 
North Korea was ahead of the South in economic strength in the early 1960s. The 
military leadership felt threatened by declining US aid and humiliated by their 
dependence on US support…”50 
I believe national security of a country depends on its economic success or failure. The 
higher the economic success the more secure the country would be. All developed 
countries are free from the threat of war or other man made calamities. Some may 
counter argue by raising the issue of the 9/11 terrorist attack on US soil. But the US is so 
powerful it managed to contain it and cripple the AlQa’eda group. Korea’s economic 
success, also, kept in check North Korean aggressive behavior. Therefore, the Korean 
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War, the of spread of communism in East Asian countries and the Viet Nam war were 
persuasive enough to motivate the Park’s regime to push for speedy economic progress.   
The grim reality of the Horn of Africa is that it is marred by war and famine. Eritrea’s 
history is history of war. There is a constant threat to its national security and sovereignty 
from neighboring countries. To fend off its enemies, it is imperative that Eritrea has to be 
economically strong. 
From the above discussion I conclude that I strongly believe Eritrea has all the necessary 
conditions that led Korea to kick start it export promotion. With proper and carefully 
tailored export promotion strategies, Eritrea is able to expand and boast its export base.  
What, then, is Eritrea’s lesson from Korea’s export promotion strategies?  
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Industrialization Strategy 
 
Unlike Korea, which totally focused on the development of its industrial base, Eritrea, on 
the other hand, with its vast arable land, can focus on both agriculture and industry. Now, 
the choice for Eritrea is which one first – agriculture or industry? 
One strategy could be the one that Korea pursued in the 60s. Develop cotton plantation 
that can be used as a source of raw material in the textile industry. The soil texture and 
climate of western lowland of Eritrea is perfect for cotton plantation. Therefore, Eritrea 
can export textile products to European countries and the US, where it enjoys 
Generalized System of Preference. The other advantage of developing the textile industry 
is that it is labor intensive and does not require highly skilled labor, which Eritrea has in 
abundance. Another Eritrea’s blessing is the Red Sea, which is rich in marine life. It is 
estimated that 70 to 80 thousand tons of fish can be harvested from the Red Sea per year. 
Therefore, developing the fishing industry would be advantageous.  
Another strategy could be to continue to aggressively encourage farmers and investors to 
engage in commercial agriculture. Eritrea’s proximity to the Arabian Peninsula could be 
an advantage. All the Oil rich Arab Sheikdoms import vegetables and fruits from as far as 
Latin American countries. If Eritrea could tap its agricultural resources, it can easily 
compete in these markets, as the transportation cost would be negligible.  
Chapter VII 
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The other possible source of growth is designating Eritrea’s Red Sea Coast as free ports – 
rendering port and warehouse services. This is a very promising strategy as the Red Sea 
is one of the busiest sea routs for commercial vessels in the world. It connects the East 
Asian countries with Europe. And Eritrea’s coast is only 4 miles away from the 
international waters. Therefore, cargo vessels can easily dock and get the required 
services.  
The above line of argument indicate that the type of industries Eritrea should focus on, as 
an engine of growth, are the same in the textile industry but different in other industries 
from those Korea focused on. 
What policy, then, should Eritrea follow to achieve rapid industrialization? Should 
Eritrea follow in Korea’s footstep: import-substitution behind high protective barriers? 
Import-substitution works well when the domestic market is relatively big, of course, at 
the cost of domestic efficiency. D.W. Nam argued, 
 “It is difficult to draw a clear line between an import substitution industry and an export 
industry. The textile industry in Korea, for example, was initially intended mainly for 
import substitution but grew into a major export industry in later years. What matters is 
the prospect for international competitiveness. Protection is almost inevitable in the early 
stage of new industry because no investment can be expected to yield a profit in the first 
one or two years of operation, while the financial capability of private business is 
generally very weak in a developing country. What is crucial is whether or not the 
protected project will be internationally competitive in the expected time horizon without 
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further protection. Seen from this perspective, the argument for protection of industry 
appears to have practical wisdom in its favor”.51   
As Eritrea’s domestic market is very narrow, the country has to focus in industries where 
it has a comparative advantage, like the textile and leather industries.  However, until 
such time the newly established industries acquire the required efficiency and experience 
so as to be able to compete in the world market, they need to be shielded from the 
cutthroat competition of the developed world. Therefore, the government needs to 
institute tariff barriers. 
 
Export Promotion Strategy 
 
Eritrea’s export performance is not encouraging. Trade statistics of the country indicate 
that import is much higher than export. To boast export, Korea’s strategy of currency 
devaluation, tax exemption and financial subsidy and other benefits such as preferential 
credit scheme are sensible and sound to Eritrea’s case. Currency devaluation helps curb 
import and boast export and tax exemption helps exporters to be competitive in world 
market. Financial subsidy will help them not to lose confidence whenever they face 
setbacks in world market. Preferential credit scheme also helps exports to expand and 
diversify their industries. The other lessons that Eritrea learns from Korea’s remarkable 
export promotion strategy are that, as amply explained by D.W. Nam, dynamism of 
entrepreneurship and business acumen.  
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Introduction of Foreign Capital 
 
Eritrea is one the poorest countries of the world. The income per capita is around $200. 
Over half of the people live below the world poverty line. Therefore, it is very difficult 
for the people to save, which could be used for capital accumulation. Thus, for Eritrea, 
the mobilization of funds for capital formation is the most pressing economic problem. 
One source could be to attract foreign direct investment. To do this, the country needs to 
come up with a law that is favorable to investors. In this regard, Eritrea has to learn a lot 
from Korea’s experience. 
The other possible source is borrowing from international lending institutions like the 
IMF and World Bank. If the fund obtained from these sources is effectively and 
efficiently utilized, Eritrea can emerge unscathed, unlike other African countries that are 
immersed in debt up to the neck. However, the problem with these lending institutions is 
that they attached conditions to their loan, which, if followed, can have a grave 
consequence. A case in point is Argentina. Argentina faithfully followed what the IMF 
prescribed her. Instead of making progress, the Argentine economy totally collapsed 
leading the country into chaos and anarchy.  
The main and third possibility is to forge strong economic and political relationships with 
reliable and rich country. 
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The Role of the Government 
 
The Korean government played a decisive role in stimulating and pushing the economy 
forward. Eritrea’s government, following in Korean footstep, should do the same to the 
country’s economy, too.  
As Eritrea’s private sector is very weak, the government has to play a key role in the 
economic development of the country. One area which warrants immediate attention is 
the formation of Trade Promotion Organization, like the one Korea established in the 
1960 – KOTRA. To widen the possibility of foreign markets, the government has to also 
join regional and international trade organizations. The other area where the Korean 
government played a key role in the country’s industrialization process is the advices it 
offered to the business community through monthly conferences. If applied in the 
Eritrean case, not only would enable to assess past performances but such forums would 
enable the government to make amendments in its policies and procedures. Eritrea has to 
also restructure its financial, customs and other government bodies in such a way, as they 
would be effective in boasting export. 
However, to create an economic group like Chaebol would not be advisable as they are 
the main source of corruption and market distorting practices, even though the Korean 
Chaebols played a leading role in the Korean economic miracle. Besides, the more the 
government confines itself to policy formulation and guidance, the better the economy 
will perform. For one, Eritrea lacks the required skilled manpower that can run such a 
huge conglomerates and for another they require a huge amount of money to establish 
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them – which Eritrea is short of. The other reason why Eritrea should avoid Chaebol style 
strategy is that these big conglomerates kill smaller but more efficient firms.  
The other area where the government of Eritrea has the possibility of drawing lessons 
from Korea is the role the financial sector played in the development endeavor.  Eritrean 
banks can play a role in extending credit to exporters at a reasonable interest rates and in 
encouraging saving that would be used for capital formation. However, nationalizing 
banks, as Korea did, would be harmful as they would not be efficient and would be a 
source of corruption. There is ample reason to believe that bank officials would favor 
someone they know in extending credits, a defect observed in the Korea case. On top of 
this, the preferential credit scheme of Korea was directed to specific industries without 
due analysis,52 a move Eritrea has to avoid. 
The love Koreans have to education and the Korean government effort to spread 
education, coupled with the Confucian emphasis on education and discipline in the 
psychic of the Korean people, created a very skilled and industrious working force – a 
vital input in the Korean economic miracle.53 Eritrea, a country with virtually no skilled 
labor, has to follow the Korean path. 
We have seen that Korea’s experience in export promotion is a good lesson to Eritrea. 
This, however, would not suffice enough to promote Eritrea’s export. Effective policy 
instruments and institutions should in place.  
                                                 
52 Professor Park, Hun Joo’s lecture, Democracy, Ethics and Public Policy, KDI, 2002. 
53 Seong Min Hong, KIME Mideast Studies, 2001 
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Bernard Hoekman and associates in the Development Research Group, World Bank, 
point out that “The first step in designing a strategy to use trade policy for growth and 
poverty alleviation is to understand how the trade regime works. This involves learning 
of the importance of non-tariff barriers, including who gets the licenses and permits. 
What is the structure of the tariff and including its dispersion, exemptions and rebates? 
How much revenue comes from tariffs? What policies are in place that may tax or 
subsidize exports? Are trade related institutions, such as standards organizations, export 
finance and marketing facilities adequate to support an expansion exports?”54 
In this Chapter an attempt is made to address such questions pertaining to the Eritrean 
situation and policy recommendations are forwarded along the discussion.  
 
The Tariff Regime of Eritrea 
 
Customs duties on imported products vary widely. In an effort to direct the use of scarce 
foreign exchange for goods that will further development objectives, the Government has 
imposed tariffs ranging from 2% to 25% on essential goods such as capital equipment, 
industrial inputs, pharmaceuticals, school supplies, books, food, livestock, and seed. 
However, customs duties on imports of capital goods, intermediate industrial spare parts, 
                                                 
54 Tarr David, Maurice Schiff, Constantine Michalopoulos, Bernard Hoekman, Development Research 
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and raw materials are fixed at a nominal 2%. On luxury goods, liquor, tobacco, 
automobiles the tariff is between 50% and 200%. All goods are found in the Customs 
Import Tariff Schedule. Tariff exemptions are granted to diplomats. Articles and 
equipment specialized for use by the disabled or handicapped are exempted from import 
taxes.55 
Even though Eritrea’s tariff regime seem to be low the very fact that it has a 
differentiated structure with different tariff escalation it affords high “effective” 
protection to final goods producers thereby discouraging the development of intermediate 
industries. 
Therefore, it is suggested that a uniform tariff regime be in place. A uniform tariff greatly 
simplifies customs operations, eliminates a number of ways used to avoid paying the 
tariff, and should help reduce corruption and save on scarce administrative resources. 
There will also be a direct saving of resources from reduced lobbying for higher 
protection. Many of these factors are pro-poor as they greatly reduce the scope for the 
exercise of power and rent seeking. However, those imports destined for exportable 
products should be exempted from tariff or nominal tariff be levied on.  
 
Emergency Protection, Antidumping and Other Trade Remedies  
 
 
Liberalization of trade will give rise to adjustment pressures as import competition 
intensifies. However, in some instances imports may expand so rapidly that governments 
may want to be able to intervene by raising trade barriers. In such cases trade intervention 
                                                 
55 Gazette of Eritrean Laws, Vol. 10/2001 No. 4, Septmber 24, 2001. 
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may be the most effective instrument available to governments. If so, the appropriate 
action to take is a so-called safeguard measure – the imposition of a temporary duty 
against all imports of the product concerned.56 So far, however, no such action has been 
taken in Eritrea. Actually, Eritrea is not yet a member of WTO. And the Government 
seems to be determined not to give protection whatsoever. This stand may hurt domestic 
producers. The most beneficiary from this action of not imposing anti-dumping measures 
is, however, the poor. This is because antidumping is a trade policy instrument that 
allows duties to be imposed on imports that are sold for less than what is charged in the 
exporting country. However, I believe that the government has to protect domestic 
producer until such time that they become competitive in the world market and 
financially viable.  
Sooner or later Eritrea would be a member of the global village gathered under the 
umbrella of WTO. Though accession of Eritrea to WTO is beyond the scope of this paper, 
the following passing comments are in place. When Eritrea joins WTO it has to make the 
maximum out of WTO provisions relating to various elements of special and differential 
(S&D) treatment that constitute a set of rights and privileges that apply to developing and 
least-developed country members and from which industrial countries are excluded.  
Oyejide, T. Amemola explains the provision of S&D as follows: “...The key S&D 
provisions that granted special trade policy discretion to the developing and least-
developed countries were codified in GATT Article XVIII. Section A of this article 
permitted developing countries to modify previously negotiated tariff bindings in order to 
assist the establishment of a particular industry; section B allowed the use of quantitative 
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import restrictions by developing countries as an instrument for dealing with balance of 
payments problems; and section C permitted developing countries to use quantitative 
import restrictions for infant industry protection. Finally, GATT Article XXVIII bis (3) 
allowed developing countries not to offer full reciprocity for negotiating concessions 
made by industrial countries, in recognition of the developing countries’ need to use 
import duties for general economic development and fiscal purposes. Similar exemptions 
from disciplines are to be found in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
measures: the agreement permits countries with per capita income of less than $1000 and 
least developed countries to maintain certain kinds of export subsidies which are 
otherwise prohibited; while for other developing countries the period over which 
subsidies can be provided is longer.57 
 
Special Customs Regimes for Exporters 
 
In Eritrea there are programs like duty drawback and temporary admission, if properly 
administered, allow exporters duty-free access to imported intermediates. These 
programs are extended to those goods that enter the country to be processed and re-
exported. However, the problem with this duty drawback scheme is that their 
administration is very costly, and led to cumbersome procedures and delays. There is also 
the risk of fraudulent claims. Even if the Customs Authority of Eritrea uses bonded 
warehouses to curb the problem, it persists. In short there is weak administrative capacity 
that leads to all the problems mentioned.  
                                                 
57 Oyejide, T. Amemola, Development, Trade and the WTO, A Hand Book, The World Bank, 2002. 
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To overcome these problems the introduction of export processing zone (EPZ) is 
suggested. EPZ is discussed further below.  
 
Export Subsidies 
 
Export subsidies may be appropriate to offset market failures but at a huge cost to the 
budget. The Government of Eritrea has made it clear that it would not extended any 
subsidy – be it to commodities destined to export or other sectors of the economy. As 
discussed in Chapters V and VII Korea’s success depended, apart from the other key 
ingredients, on effective export subsidy strategy, which was strictly implemented on 
export performance. Eritrea’s export base is very weak and narrow. To expand the export 
base, the government has to introduce export subsidy scheme for the producers that are 
engaged in export.  
 
Export Taxes 
 
To promote the development of export industries, all export are exempted from duties 
and sales taxes. However, many items cannot be exported from Eritrea including 
national/cultural treasures and endangered wildlife. Certain commodities may require 
clearance from specific government bodies; i.e., livestock and cereals require the 
permission of the Ministry of Agriculture, marine products require the permission of the 
Ministry of Fisheries. 
Through lobbying of tanneries and in an attempt to support local processing industries, 
the export of rawhide and skin is resisted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In this 
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case the restriction is economically inefficient because it reduces the incentive to produce 
the primary product relative to the incentive to process it.  
The Government’s effort to exempt all commodities from export duties is commendable 
but it has to abolish the restriction such as the one imposed on the export of rawhide and 
skin.  
 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
 
Eritrea possesses a very strategic position in one of the busiest sea routes of the world – 
The Red Sea. Following suit of U.A.E. Eritrea can capitalize this unique position by 
designating its coastal areas as free export processing zones. It can also designate its two 
ports as “free ports”. The Port of Assab, the bigger of the two ports, is only 4 nautical 
miles from the international waters. If this port is designated as a free port then all 
shipments from Europe destined to the port of Dubai, U.A.E. and other ports in the 
Arabian Peninsula can cut their rout and cost considerably. 
The Government of Eritrea is well known for its anti-terrorist stance, while its 
neighboring countries like the Sudan, Yemen and others back terrorist groups. 
Particularly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the US it became apparent that Eritrea’s 
ports are safe haven and the Government should capitalize on this newfound opportunity. 
The Government actually has already designated the port of Massawa as a free port and is 
putting the entire required infrastructure in place, including a modern airport and 
rehabilitating the port with the money secured from the World Bank.  
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However, the management of this free zone and those that would be designated in the 
future has to be given due and serious thought – least it may lead to corruption and other 
undesirable social problems.  
Attracting investment into EPZs is a function of many factors, including some that are 
national – such as political stability and sound macroeconomic management. Eritrea is 
one of the rare African nations that enjoy a stable political situation and is one of the few 
countries of the world were crime is practically non-existent. The Government is 
renowned for its anti-corruption stance. However the Government may come with 
attractive macroeconomic policy unless there is a well-organized and efficient body with 
skilled personnel to implement it the result will be dismal.  
It is, therefore, suggested that the Government has to pursue with its plan of designating 
more places for EPZs but at the same time has to install sound macroeconomic policy and 
see to its efficient implementation. 
 
Other Trade Related Institutions 
 
Customs Clearance 
 
Efficient and transparency is an important determinant of the costs associated with trade. 
Burdensome and redundant procedures – red tape – can give rise to substantial 
uncertainty and are often associated with rent seeking and corruption.58 Because of the 
cumbersome and lengthy procedures introduced by the government of Eritrea in the early 
                                                 
58 Tarr David, Maurice Schiff, Constantine Michalopoulos, Bernard Hoekman, Development Research 
Group, International Trade Team, World Bank, 2001 
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years of independence corruption and rent seeking was widely practiced. This forced the 
Government to introduce a stringent law to combat corruption. However, the customs 
clearance procedures need to be stream lined.  
The following are necessary for imported goods: commercial invoice, bill of 
lading/airway bill, certificate of origin, and health (where applicable), as well as an 
import license.  
The following export documents are required: EUR1 certificate for export of goods to the 
European Union, PTA certificate of origin for export to the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
Documentary requirements are stringent, and documents are sometimes delayed in 
bureaucratic channels. Although a somewhat cumbersome system can slow clearance of 
documents, minimal corruption and theft mitigate these problems.  
In conclusion, however the Government’s effort to make the customs clearance free of 
corruption is commendable it has to seek ways and means to shorten the procedure and 
make it transparent.  
 
Export Finance 
 
Export finance is one of the primary constraints inhibiting exports in many low-income 
developing countries. Inadequacies may result from the overall weakness of the financial 
sector, or it may reflect difficulties in assessing the creditworthiness of traders or the fact 
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that traders do not have sufficient assets to be judged creditworthy.59 Eritrea is not an 
exception. In Eritrea, exporters face special difficulties in obtaining access to the trade 
credit they need. This is partly the banks are owned by the Government. The bureaucratic 
delays and securing collateral led to corruption and rent seeking.  
It is suggested that either the Government privatize the banking institutions or seek ways 
of remedying this malady. The Government can use a number of mechanisms to promote 
access to finance, especially for smaller firms.  
According to De Wulf, Luc and Philip English the two mechanisms that are sometimes 
used are foreign currency revolving funds and preshipment export finance guarantee 
schemes. 
 
Product Standards 
 
Product standardization facilitates interconnection of goods and information exchange, 
and guarantee safety, health, quality or the environment. Cognizant of this fact the 
Government of Eritrea established a standard institute – The Eritrean Standards Institute 
(ESI). The Institution is mandated to ensure conformance to international classification of 
standards and Eritrean standards.  
However, ESI suffers from technical and financial shortcomings. It is, therefore, 
suggested that the Government should ensure that ESI is technically well equipped and is 
staffed with qualified and highly motivated personnel. This can be achieved by seeking 
the cooperation and assistance of developed countries. 
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Marketing 
 
One of the biggest problems of exporters is lack of information, product and country 
recognition, and concerns about quality. These is mainly due to the fact that there is high 
illiteracy among the business people and inefficiency of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, a Government body shouldered with the responsibility of promoting trade and 
industry, and the National Chamber of Commerce – a private organization. These two 
institutions lend no services to traders. Traders are left to struggle to achieve their goal on 
their own.  
The Ministry of Trade and Industry is supposed to do the job but proved to be impotent. 
The best solution would be to create “Trade Commission”, like KOTRA, the one Korea 
established in the early days of its development, which would be solely responsible to the 
promotion of trade. This “Trade Commission” will have Trade Promotion Unit” and 
“Trade Policy Follow up Unit” under it that looks into securing foreign markets and vital 
trade information and assess the impact of the policy and propose remedial solutions, 
respectively. Exporters also have the responsibility of overhauling their Chamber of 
Commerce. As all producers and traders are members of this organization, they have to 
push for a better service. 
 
International Cooperation: Regional Integration and the WTO 
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Eritrea is one of the 20 members of “Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa” 
(COMESA), which offers preferential terms for trade among its members. Eritrea is also 
a signatory to the “Cotonuo Agreement”, which allows goods to enter the European 
Union markets duty and quota free, as long as the goods qualify with the rules of origin 
criteria. Eritrea is also allowed to enjoy the “Generalized System of Preferences” for 
similar duty and quota free treatment of exports to the US. 
So far Eritrea has failed to take advantage of these agreements partly because the 
exporting sector is underdeveloped and partly either due to the weakness of the 
organization (COMESA) or the conditions EU and the US attach to their preferential 
treatments. COMESA is marred with efficiency and regional politics, poor 
communication among member states, poor infrastructure and above all low level of 
purchasing power of their people make trading among them next to impossible.  
The health, quality standards, political, human rights, etc., conditions that the EU and US 
attach to their offering of preferential treatments are simply unattainable. Under the 
pretext of preferential treatment they try to meddle in the internal affairs of developing 
countries and would want to dictate their terms. In addition, as the main export item of 
developing countries is agricultural products, it is difficult to compete in European 
markets as these products are highly subsidized by EU member states.  
It is, therefore, recommended that Eritrea have to seek bilateral trade agreements with 
highly developed countries where there will be not only transfer of technology and know-
how but foreign direct investment (FDI) and a secured market. It is also advisable to form 
bilateral trade agreements with neighboring countries.  
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Eritrea’s Accession to WTO 
 
Within the rules and disciplines of the WTO, each country has considerable scope as to 
how restrictive or liberal its trade regime will be.60 Eritrea, when and if decided to accede 
to WTO, it has to pursue a strategy of liberalizing as little as is necessary to ensure 
accession. This will enable the country to have a broader chance and latitude in future 
negotiations. However, as Eritrea is a very small and underdeveloped country, it has little 
leverage in market access negotiations, and so the potential benefit it is supposed to 
realize may be small if the liberalization it makes during negotiations is very small. This 
is because the costs of protection are high and its small economic size poses fewer market 
access issues of major WTO members. The country has to, also, seek to obtain transition 
periods and other special and differential treatment the WTO agreements extend to 
developing countries.  
 
The Protocols of GATT/WTO Relevant to Eritrea 
 
Hibbert, Edgar P. explains the GATT/WTO protocols pertaining to developing countries 
as follows: 
“…Government export promotion is regulated by the rules on subsidies contained in 
Articles XVI of the General Agreement and the Subsidiaries Code. The latter resulted 
from the Tokyo (1982) and Uruguay (1993) Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations and 
was intended to clarify the substantive procedures of Article XVI through ‘transparency’ 
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and more efficient remedial measures, not only in subsidies, but in licensing, 
‘countervailing’ and anti-dumping duties (Article VI), import licensing and Government 
procurement. The more recent Uruguay Round has extended these provisions, with some 
qualifications, to intellectual property services, textiles and agricultural produce. 
In order to come within the GATT rules, a Government export promotion measure must 
first constitute a subsidy. There is no definition of this term I the General Agreement or 
the Subsidies Code, but both clearly indicate that a subsidy connotes some form of 
financial support. Article XVI:1 mentions specifically ‘any form of income or price 
support’; an authoritative definition describes a subsidy as ‘a measurable economic 
advantage afforded to an enterprise by or at the direction of a Government’. This perhaps 
is the best definition of a subsidy under the GATT rules. It is not, however, the subsidy 
per se that is subject to GATT regulation; there must also be an effect on exports that 
distorts normal trading patterns. Thus Article XVI:!, which deals with subsidies in 
general, singles out those that operate directly or indirectly to increase exports in a 
manner that causes or threatens to cause serious prejudice to the interests of other 
contracting parties.”61 
GATT barriers to Government export promotion operate, therefore, only against those 
measures that confer a measurable economic advantage on domestic exporters that 
distorts trading patterns by increasing exports to a higher level than would otherwise be 
the case. Government export promotion measures, such as direct fiscal subsidies for 
exports, and “dumping” fall into this category. 
Hibbert, Edgar P. further points out those GATT/WTO articles that can be used by 
developing countries, including Eritrea, without violating WTO rules. These are articles 
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VI and XVI of the WTO agreement. Article VI permits Governments to levy 
compensatory countervailing duties on imported goods that benefit from a subsidy in the 
exporting country. According to Article XVI export subsidies on non-primary products 
are excepted unless they produce ‘trade distorting effects’ which would make them 
actionable. And a crucial point with respect to ‘contingent protection’ is that under XVI 
and the Subsidies Code the subsidy causing distortion is defined as ‘displacing’ another 
signatory’s exports to a third country market or adversely affecting the domestic market 
of a signatory.  
Under GATT short term tariff protection was permitted to Governments where new 
‘infant’ industry needed protection against cheap imports or some established industry 
was suffering ‘material injury’ through unfair competition such as dumping, 
discriminatory tariffs and refusal to accord MFN status.62  
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Macroeconomic and Exchange Rate Policies 
 
As a result of the border war with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s macro-stability of the economy is 
shaky. It needs to be addressed urgently. The exchange rate mechanism is “floating 
system”. Since May 1, 1998 float of the Nakfa (local currency) there are no foreign 
exchange controls. Banks are allowed to set up foreign currency accounts and make 
foreign currency loans. This liberalization of the exchange rate revealed that the currency 
was over-valued. After the introduction of this policy, however, the currency is devalued, 
which will make imports more expensive and exports more profitable in domestic 
currency.  
Therefore, it is suggested that the Government introduce a series of policy measures to 
ensure macro-stability so that the devaluation be accomplished without further 
debilitating losses in reserves.  
 
Labor and Other Factor Markets 
 
In Eritrea, there is very low labor mobility in Government institutions. This is because of 
the Government’s refusal to release anyone who wants to quite his/her job. The reason 
why people want to quite government job is that for one the salary is not competitive and 
Complementary Policy to Trade Reforms
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for another the rigidity of the structure. In the private sector, however, there is no 
government regulation that prohibits the movement of employees.  
Therefore, the Government has to reform its policy in such a way as to allow free 
mobility of the employees. Property rights to land and other factors are also important to 
boast export. In Eritrea, the government owns the land. The Government has made it 
clear that anyone who is interested to invest in the country can easily acquire land 
through reasonable lease. Often than not, however, investors are heard complaining for 
bureaucratic delays. 
  
Competition Policies 
 
As such there are no barriers to international competition and no barriers to entry against 
domestic firms in Eritrea. There are, however, parastatal marketing boards such as 
Eritrean Grain Board (EGB), Ali Gider Cotton Plantation and Allied Afro – Trading 
Company. The Eritrea Grain Board’s objective is to stabilize the price of grain. During 
the harvest time the price of grain falls due to increased supply. To protect the interest of 
the farmers, then, EGB offers a minimum of 50% higher price than the grain traders. It is 
not engaged in export. Therefore, the existence of EGB, in the short – run, is good for the 
farmers but in the long – run it has to cease to exist for the simple reason that it will pave 
the way for corruption and inefficiencies. The help of the Government should be confined 
to extending financial assistance and introducing new technology and markets. 
Ali Gider Cotton Plantation is a state owned company. Apart from being engaged in 
cotton plantation, it also encourages small farmers who are engaged in cotton plantation 
through the provision of cottonseeds and marketing. However, because these small 
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farmers have severe financial problem they are forced to sell their output at the price set 
by this parastatal company. Whether this parastatal company buys them at a reasonable 
price or not is of less importance. What is important, however, is that it has to extend 
financial assistance and at the same time teach them how to secure a market. In short 
“teach them how to fish, not how to eat a fish”. 
Allied Afro-Trading Company is a state owned trading company whose primary 
objective is to export industrial products to the Great Lake Countries of Central Africa. 
Because it is poorly staffed and the decision making process is tedious it is dead on 
arrival case. It never scored any profit nor managed to successfully penetrate foreign 
markets.  
It is suggested that the Government abolish or privatize these parastatal companies and 
divert its meager resources in assisting those private enterprises engaged in the same 
business. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Intellectual Property Protection 
 
Eritrea’s Investment Proclamation of 1994 established a framework of investment. It 
eliminates joint venture prerequisites, opens all sectors of the economy to foreign 
investment (except for domestic retail and wholesale trade, import and commission 
agency), reduces tax on profits, allows remittance of profits in foreign exchange, and 
minimizes customs duties on selected import items.63  However, there is not, as yet, 
established a simple set of steps for registering a foreign investment in Eritrea. There is 
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bureaucratic delay for approval. In addition, on paper, authorization power is vested with 
the Investment Center. In practice, large-scale projects are approved at the highest levels.  
It is suggested, therefore, that the Government has to introduce a system whereby it 
greatly reduces the red tape of acquiring investment permission and has to effectively 
enforce the benefits the investment proclamation offers. 
Regarding protection of Property right, Eritrea has a civil law, codified system where 
private property is protected by law. Even though land is not bought or sold buildings and 
other improvements are private property and protected by the civil code. National and 
international copyrights and patents are protected under the commercial code. Eritrea is 
also a member of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  
However, Eritrea neither has an office that enforces intellectual property rights nor does 
have qualified personnel capable of enforcing these rights.  
As enforcing property rights is one key issues potential foreign investors look at in 
deciding an investment, the Government has to create an independent patent office whose 
sole responsibility is to enforce this right. 
Rights to “Private ownership and Establishment” are clearly stated in the investment 
proclamation. The investment proclamation specifically requires the investment center to 
issue certification within ten days from the completion by the investor of the required 
formalities. The investment proclamation eliminates the requirement for joint ventures or 
acquire Eritrean partners, thus projects can be wholly owned by private foreign 
companies. Projects will be examined to ensure that the plans include training Eritrean 
staff to replace expatriate workers and that the projects will not negatively affect the 
environment or local conditions. 
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Licensing System 
 
The licensing system of Eritrea is a one-stop shop where any one can acquire license with 
in one hour. However, license for retailing and importation are not issued to foreigners. 
As the domestic market is very narrow and these type of business can be done by 
nationals thus the decision seem to be of sound judgment. 
 
Transparency of the Regulatory System 
 
Eritrea is gradually emerging from the centrally planned economy of the Ethiopian Derg 
government. The private sector is only slowly reawakening, and government policies 
permitting competitive, market-based adjustments through privatization, revenue reform, 
and other actions are fairly new. 
Eritrea presents many bureaucratic barriers to investors, which are frequently cited by US 
and other business representatives as major problems.  These include difficulties with 
customs clearance, obtaining telephone/fax service and public utility hookups, locating 
appropriate office space, leasing land, and obtaining work permits and various 
government offices. 
Even though the Government of Eritrea is new and is still learning how to run the country, 
this cannot be used as an excuse not to institute an efficient government apparatus. It has 
to take a clear measure that technocrats occupy all the government posts, save the 
politically sensitive ones. It has to also ensure all the government regulations are clear 
and un-ambiguous.  
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Corruption 
 
Corruption is not a significant barrier or hindrance to investment or trade in Eritrea. The 
Government and business investment is considered to be relatively free of corruption 
from the top down. The penal code provides punishment for giving or accepting bribes 
and embezzlement. A special court is set up to specifically deal with corruption, 
embezzlement and theft.  
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The importance of Agriculture 
 
Because the overwhelming majority of the poor in Eritrea are located in rural areas (80% 
of the population) and are employed in agriculture, how trade reform affects agriculture 
will critically affect its overall impact on poverty alleviation.  
Admittedly, the Government of Eritrea is doing its best to boast agricultural production. 
It is extending its financial assistance to commercial farmers, trying its best to introduce 
new methods of farming and seeds, offering training opportunities to farmers in animal 
husbandry, supplying pesticide and fertilizers, building micro dams and terracing the 
landscape. However, it has to device ways and means to increase the ability of the 
farmers to shift to the production of new products (possibly exportable products whose 
price has risen) through necessary complementary reforms such as infusion of additional 
capital or increasing access to water. Given that poor farmers may be hurt in the short run 
as a result of shifting to the production of new products, compensation policies such as 
improving rural infrastructure, research and development and creating educational 
opportunities for children are important.  
 
Chapter X 
Sector Issues 
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The Role of Services 
 
The importance of an efficient service sector goes beyond the contribution of the services 
sector itself to the balance of payments, because the efficiency of many service sectors is 
a key determinant of the competitiveness of firms.64 Key sectors that influence the ability 
of firms to participate in world trade are telecommunications, transportation, financial 
services and other business services such as accounting and legal services. 
The Eritrean telecommunication Authority is the sole state owned provider of 
telecommunication services. As mentioned above, there is acute shortage of 
telecommunication services in the country. As it is a state owned with no competitor, the 
rate that it charges is exorbitant. The solution would be to privatize it and invite foreign 
telecom companies to invest in the country.  
Eritrea does not have flag carrier airlines. It depends on the services of others such as 
German’s Lufthansa, Egypt Air, Yeminia, British Air and others. However, because of 
high freight rates the export of cut flowers to European markets is becoming a problem. 
Understandably, running an airline, in that a very competitive market requires a huge 
amount of resources in terms of finance and human expertise. This can be tackled 
through joint venture with some dependable airlines. 
The marine transport sector is not well developed, too. The few cargo ships available are 
of limited capacity and are privately owned. Again, to speed up delivery of goods to and 
from there ought to be a well developed marine transport service. This can be achieved 
through joint venture or allowing foreign shipping companies to use Eritrean flag.  
                                                 
64 Tarr David, Maurice Schiff, Constantine Michalopoulos, Bernard Hoekman, Development Research 
Group, International Trade Team, World Bank, 2001 
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The Eritrean banking system can be characterized as “strong but primitive”. All banks 
operate alongside the Central Bank of Eritrea. To make Eritrea a financial hub the 
Government has to allow foreign banks to come to the country and have to privatize the 
already existing ones and encourage new privately owned ones to sprung.  
Road transport is no exception, either. This is due to high cost of fuel, unpaved roads, and 
high cost of spare parts and above all low market for transport services due to low 
economic development. This problem will phase out with the passage of time as the 
economy develops. 
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Eritrea’s current situation, particularly after the devastating border war with Ethiopia, has 
a strong resemblance to the Korean situation of the 1950s and 1960s. From the discussion 
above, we can conclude that all the necessary and vital conditions that led to Korea’s 
successful export promotion are also found in Eritrea. Hence, Korea’s export promotion 
strategies are good lessons to Eritrea. We have said that even though policies have to be 
designed to suit ones’ country situation, the export promotion strategies and policies 
pursued by Korea are an excellent source of lessons to Eritrea. Based on this conclusion, 
we tried to suggestion some policy recommendation. To wrap up the following are the 
conclusion we arrived at: 
1. The type of industry that Eritrea should focus for its growth strategy differs from 
that of Korea except in the textile industry. 
2. Korea’s import-substitution strategy does not work for Eritrea. 
3. The protective barriers employed by Korea can safely be applied to the enfant 
Eritrean industries. 
4. Korea’s export promotion policies are highly applicable to the Eritrean case. 
5. The introduction of foreign capital policy of Korea can be emulated to the 
Eritrean case. 
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6. The role of the Korean government is undeniably vital. There is no doubt that a 
committed government like that of Korea, which lucky Eritrea got one of its own, 
can transform a back warded economy into a thriving one. However, for the 
reasons cited in chapter VII the formation of conglomerates like the Korean 
Chaebols would not be suitable for Eritrea’s case.  
7. Again the confiscation of Banks, which Korea did, is not advisable in the Eritrean 
case. 
8. The effort exerted by Korea to create a highly skilled and yet cheap labor is 
commendable, which Eritrea needs to follow, if at all it wishes to win its own 
niche in the world market.   
However the policies pursued by Korea may seem rosy to Eritrea’s case, policies alone 
do not guarantee development. The concept of development is not only confined to 
industrialization but to the issue of income and political equality, freedom, environmental 
protection and others. Development goes beyond satisfying one’s hunger: freedom and 
justice. 
The Park government delivered rapid economic growth to the Korean people but the cost 
of freedom and human values was beyond measure. The dark sides of the Korean 
economic miracle, lack of democratic rights, social values and environmental degradation, 
cannot be simply dismissed as unimportant. The massive state intervention in the 
economy and top-down administrative practices eroded the confidence of the people to 
do things in their own way led the economy to be vulnerable to outside shock.65   
                                                 
65 Professor Park, Hun Joo’s lecture, Democracy, Ethics and Public Policy, KDI, 2002. 
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Therefore, Eritrea may emulate some of the economic policies of Korea but cannot afford 
to instill an authoritarian government like the one Korea had. Democracy and rule of law 
are much more valuable to the people of Eritrea than mere economic progress. Eritrea can 
achieve what Korea did in the last five decades without resorting to Korean style 
government. I believe economic development should be accompanied by democracy and 
rule of law. And the economic development should take into account income equality, 
environmental protection and social values and norms. 
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Appendix A 
Table I           
   
Value of Re- Exports by Commodity 
Descripition, 1995 - 2001    
           
       In '000 of Nakfa  
Commodity Description  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Food and Live Animals, Chiefly for food 90,083 55,633 58,429 44,984 39,290 65,653 51,113
Beverages and Tobacco  1,473 463 424 121 66 3 22
Crude Materials, Except Fuel  2,296 3,106 1,724 81 39 497 1,077
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 113 239 52 87 0 0 0
Animal and Vegetable Oil, Fat and Wax 1,556 2,514 1,311 20 1,548 185 80
Chemicals and Related Materials n.e.s. 2,487 2,393 1,194 619 184 403 142
Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 39,554 24,262 6,106 3,911 3,908 4,329 4,536
Machinery and Transport Equipment 18,066 26,000 9,487 1,987 28,936 3,343 1,028
Miscellaneous manufactured Aritcles 17,778 11,913 4,576 521 1,459 585 1,853
Total Re-Exports   173,406 126,523 83,303 52,331 75,430 74,998 59,851
 
Source: Trade Report: Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2002 
 
N.B. 1USD = 10.4Nakfa 
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Table II           
   
Value of Exports by Commodity 
Descripition, 1995 - 2001    
       In Millions Of Nakfa  
Commodity Description  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Food and Live Animals, Chiefly for food 51,171 36,786 22,831 13,310 28,906 44,119 28,266
Beverages and Tobacco  18,272 25,732 8,482 144 384 470 1,284
Crude Materials, Except Fuel  153,821 119,898 127,775 89,079 24,173 37,205 29,672
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 2 9 4 0 0 0 0
Animal and Vegetable Oil, Fat and Wax 608 93 54 5 14 34 0
Chemicals and Related Materials n.e.s. 9,541 10,954 6,997 3,442 3,935 5,921 6,951
Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 60,770 64,027 58,340 22,220 20,330 21,760 50,773
Machinery and Transport Equipment 2,129 1,710 1,282 2,666 1,581 49 4
Miscellaneous manufactured Aritcles 59,107 134,696 66,299 13,309 8,844 4,097 3,234
Total Exports   355,421 393,905 292,064 144,175 88,167 
113,65
5 120,184
Source: Trade Report: Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2002 
 
N.B. 1USD = 10.4Nakfa 
 
 
Source: Trade Report: Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2002 
 
N.B. 1USD = 10.4Nakfa 
 
Table III           
   
Value of Imports by Commodity 
Descripition, 1995 - 2001    
           
        In '000 of Nakfa  
Commodity Description  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Food and Live Animals, Chiefly for food 426,733 542,857 599,880 460,027 747,718 
1,125,65
9 1,130,913
Beverages and Tobacco  10,651 23,507 22,366 20,190 18,826 13,770 23,834
Crude Materials, Except Fuel  65,906 116,487 67,745 43,719 77,019 58,096 30,675
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 48,223 39,505 52,504 41,315 31,405 51,043 37,114
Animal and Vegetable Oil, Fat and Wax 28,819 55,014 57,557 71,279 89,832 111,241 138,274
Chemicals and Related Materials n.e.s. 144,201 209,742 182,787 152,504 298,562 241,016 471,119
Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 478,104 733,820 678,490 642,448 635,922 726,693 1,034,812
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
1,165,95
2 1,091,139 1,158,209 1,039,570 996,191 771,236 1,095,677
Miscellaneous manufactured Aritcles 166,939 250,781 242,728 231,113 233,163 245,272 350,953
Commodities and Transactions n.e.s. 0 0 63 0 0 0 0
Total Imports   
2,535,52
8 3,062,852 3,062,329 2,702,165 3,128,638 
3,344,02
6 4,313,371
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Appendix B 
People 1996 1999 2000 
Population, Total 3.7 million 4.0 million 4.1 million
Population Growth (annual %) 2.7 2.8 2.6
National Poverty Rate (% of population) - - -
Life expectancy at birth (years) - - 52
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) - - 5.4
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) - - 59.6
Mortality rate, under – 5 (per 1,000 live births) - - 102.9
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) - - -
Malnutrition prevalence (% of children under 5) - - -
Urban population (% of total) 17.4 18.4 18.7
Prevalence of HIV (female, % ages 15 –24) - - -
Illiteracy rate, adult male (% of males 15+) 36.2 33.5 32.7
Illiteracy rate, adult female (% of females 15+) 59.5 56.5 55.5
Net primary enrollment (% of relevant age group) 30.4 - -
Girls in primary school (% of total enrollment) 45.1 - -
Net secondary enrollment (% of relevant age group) 15.7 - -
Girls in secondary school (% of total enrollment) 41.8 - -
Environment  
Surface area (sq. km)  117,6000 117,6000 117,6000
Forest area (sq. km) - - 15,850
Annual deforestation (% of change) - - 0.3
Freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters) - - 2,147.9
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) - - -
Improved water source (% of total population with access) - - 46.0
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Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban 
population with access) 
- - 66.0
Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent) - - -
Electricity use per capita (kwh) - - -
Economy  
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) 747.6 million 791.8 million 696.2 million
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 200.0 200.0 170.0
GDP (current $) 631.1 million 648.5 million 607.6 million
GDP growth (annual %) 6.8 0.8 -8.2
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 2.9 8.2 18.4
Agriculture value added (% of GDP) 9.8 17.1 -
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 27.4 29.2 -
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 62.8 53.7 -
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 31.7 10.1 15.7
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 92.0 92.1 86.1
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 29.3 39.1 38.0
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) - - -
Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP) - - -
Technology and infrastructure  
Fixed lines and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people) 5.1 7.3 7.9
Telephone average cost of local call (US $ per three 
minutes) 
0.0 0.0 0.0
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 1.5 1.6
Internet users 0.0 900.0 5000.0
Paved roads (% of total) 21.8 21.8 -
Aircraft departures - - -
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Trade and finance  
Trade I goods as a share of GDP (%) - - -
Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP (%) - - -
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) - - -
Net barter terms of trade (1995 = 100)  - - -
Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting 
country (current US$) 
36.7 million 36.0 million 35.0 million
Present value of debt (current US$) - - 187.9 million
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services) 0.0 1.6 1.1
Short-term debt outstanding (current US$) 0.0 200.0 thousand 13.1 million
Aid per capita (current US$) 43.4 37.3 43.0
Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  84
 
 
 
 
1. Eritrea Investment Brochure, 1993. 
2. Macroeconomic Policy of the Government of the State of Eritrea, Nov. 1994. 
3. Trade Report, Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Government of the State of 
Eritrea, 1998. 
4. Ogbazghi, Bereket-AB, A collection of Country Report, Courses on Trade 
Promotion Strategies for African Countries, KDI & KOICA, 2000. 
5. Sato, Akihiro, “Is and EP policy for trading”, College of Policy and Planning 
Sciences, University of Tsukuba, June 25, 2002. 
6. Krueger, Anne O., “The Effects of Trade Strategies on Growth”, Finance and 
Development, June 1993. 
7. Liang, Hong, “A thesis on the rational of substitution industrialization strategy”, 
ISBN: 1-58112-007-9, University of Denver, USA. 
8. Urrutia, Miguel and Seiji Naya, “Lessons in Development: A comparative study 
of Asia and Latin America”, International Center for Economic growth, 1989. 
9. Hyun Nam, Chong, “Paper presented to the eleventh Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference”, Sept. 1980, KDI, Seoul, Korea. 
10. English, Philip, Aaditya Mattoo and Bernard Hoekman, ed., “Development, Trade, 
and the WTO”, A Hand Book, World Bank, 2002.  
11. Keesing, Donald B., “Outward Looking Policies and Economic Development,” 
Economic Journal, June 1967. 
Bibliography 
  85
12. Seong Min Hong, “Modernization and Economic Development in the Korean 
Economy”, KIME Mideast Studies, 2001. 
13. Jungho Yoo, “Neoclassical versus Revisionist View of Korean Economic 
Growth”, Discussion paper No. 588, Harvard University, June 1997. 
14. Jong-Il, You, “A Reflection on the Korean Miracle: Toward a New Concept of 
Development”, 1995. 
15. Bon-Ho, Koo, “Korea’s Experience of Economic Development”, KDI, 2002. 
16. Yoon, Tae-Yong, “Planning for export led growth and development in the 
Republic of Korea”, Financial Policy Division, Ministry of Finance and Economy, 
Gyunggido, Korea. 
17. Son, Jungshik, “Money and Banking for Economic Development – Korea early 
development decades”, 1996. 
18. Jang, Ha-Won and Jong-Il You, “Changing Role of the State in South Korea: 
From Leading to Supporting the Market”, International Journal of Economic 
Planning Literature, Vol.16, No 3 & 4, 2001. 
19. Hun Joo, David Park, “Lectures on Democracy, Ethics and Public Policy”, KDI, 
Fall Term, 2002. 
20. D.W. Nam, “Paper for Conference on South Africa’s International Economic 
Relations in the 1990s”, April 1993, Tranvaal, South Africa. 
21. Tarr David, Maurice Schiff, Constantine Michalopoulos and Bernard Hoekman, 
“Trade Policy Reform and Poverty Alleviation”, Development Research Group, 
International Trade Team, World Bank, 2001. 
22. www.shaebia.org 
23. www.biddho.com 
  86
24. Hibbert, Edgar P., “Trade Promotion – The Uses of Trade Policy to Develop 
Exports”. 
25. Ahn, Dukgeun, “Trade Policy Formulation in Asian Countries”, KDI, Nove. 2002. 
26. Gazette of Eritrean Laws, Vol. 10/2001 No.4, Asmara, Eritrea. 
27. Gandolfo, Giancarlo, “International Trade theory and Policy”, Springer, 1998. 
28. T.N. Srinivasan, Arvind Panagariya and Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “Lectures on 
International Trade”, 2nd ed., The MIT press, 1998. 
29. Sapir, Andre, and Jaime de Melo, ed., “Trade theory and Economic reform: North, 
South, and East”, Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
30. E. Maskus, Keith, William H. Kaempter, James R. Melvin, and James R. 
Markusen, “International Trade: Theory and evidence”, Mc Grow Hill, 1995. 
31. Song, Ligang, and Peter Drysdale, ed., “China’s Entry to the WTO”, Routledge, 
2000. 
32. A. Hamdani, and John H. Dunning, ed., “The New Globalism and Developing 
Countries”, United Nations University Press, 1997. 
33. World Development Report 1987, WDR87. 
34. Doo-Yun, Hwang, “Korea’s International Trade Policy in the Global Age”, East 
Asian Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, Autumn 2001, PP 3-20. 
 
  
